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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Appellant, John Hunting Whittier ("Whittier"), appeals from the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment to Respondent Howard Houston ("Houston"). Houston sued Whittier for 
violation of Oregon's securities laws based on certain investments made by Houston in Wood River 
Partners, LP ("Wood River"). Houston sought partial summary judgment on liability, claiming that 
Whittier had admitted to violations of Oregon's securities laws by: (1) taking the Fifth Amendment 
in the Answer; or (2) pleading guilty to criminal violations of the Federal Securities and Exchange 
Act. Although the District Court properly rejected the Fifth Amendment argument, it granted 
summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds, finding that Whittier violated Oregon securities 
laws based exclusively on a limited guilty plea in the federal criminal action. In addition, the District 
Court erroneously granted summary judgment based on Oregon, rather than Idaho, law. Moreover, 
the District Court granted summary judgment based on an untimely affidavit, filed in support of an 
untimely reply brief and containing inadmissible hearsay. Finally, the District Court, without a 
fiuther motion by Houston, granted summary judgment as to damages without requiring tender and 
delivery by Houston to Whittier of the Wood River securities that were the subject of the final 
judgment. The District Court's grant of summaryjudgment and entry of a final judgment should be 
reversed and the matter remanded. 
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B. Course of Proceediiys 
Houston filed his Complaint against Whittier on August 30, 2006. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 5-25.)' 
The Complaint alleged six causes of action: (1) violation of Oregon securities law, Or. Rev. Stat. 
("ORS") 59.135 and 59.137; (2) violation of Oregon securities law, ORS 59.1 15(l)(b); (3) violation 
of Oregon securities law, ORS 59.1 15(l)(a); (4) violation of Oregon securities law, ORS 59.115(3) 
ds against Defendant Seward & Kissel only; (5) breach of fiduciary duty; and (6) negligence. (Id.) 
On December 7, 2006, Whittier filed his Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. (R., 
Vol. 1, pp. 37-63.) 
On October 30,2007, Houstonmade aMotion for Partial Summary Judgment on the first and 
second causes of action alleging violations of the Oregon securities laws. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 85-87.) 
The Motion fails to identifjr the specific grounds upon which partial summary judgment was sought. 
(Id.) However, Houston contemporaneously filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking partial summary judgment on the issue 
of liability only: Whittier has admitted to his wrongdoing in entering a guilty plea in a separate 
federal criminal matter thereby creating ''m as a matter of law under ORS 59.135 and 
ORS 59.137." (R., Vol. 1, pp. 99-101 (emphasis added).) 
'Houston also filed the Complaint against Seward & Kissel, LLP, the law firm for Wood 
River tasked with drafting the offering agreements and advising Wood River of its reporting 
requirements. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 5-25.) Seward & Kissel was dismissed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12@)(2) 
for lack of personal jurisdiction. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 80-82.) 
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Defendant Whittier's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment was filed on January 14,2008. (Appellant's Motion to Augment Clerk's Record ("Motion 
to Augment"), Ex. A.) The Affidavit of John Hunting Whittier was also filed. (Id., Ex. B.) 
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Reply 
Memorandum") was filed on January 22,2008, but not received by Whittier until January 23,2008, 
for a hearing scheduled on January 28,2008. (Id., Ex. C.) Also received on that same date was the 
Declaration of Peter Shames in Support of Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum. 
(R., Vol. 1, pp. 102-04.) On January 24,2008, Whittier moved to strike the Shames declaration as 
untimely, not in proper affidavit form, and containing inadmissible hearsay. (Motion to Augment, 
Ex. D.) Whittier also moved to strike Houston's untimely Reply Memorandum in support of 
summary judgment. (Id.) At the hearing on January 28,2008, Houston made an oral request that 
he be allowed to substitute an Affidavit of Peter Shames for the Declaration of Peter Shames. (Tr., 
Vol. 1, pp. 11-13.) 
On February 1, 2008, the District Court issued its order which, in relevant part: granted 
Houston's oral request to file a substituted Affidavit of Peter Shames and denied Whittier's motion 
to strike the affidavit as hearsay and as untimely; denied Whittier's motion to strike Houston's 
untimely Reply Memorandum; made factual findings "pursuant to Rule 56(d)" with respect to 
Houston's motion for partial summary judgment; granted partial summary judgment to the extent 
the court subsequently determined that Oregon (as opposed to Idaho) securities law applies on the 
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grounds that the guilty plea to federal securities law violations established, without more, violations 
of Oregon state security laws; and reserved for further proceedings the question of whether Oregon 
or Idaho law applies. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 110-13.) 
On February 14,2008, Whittier filed his Memorandum in Support of the Application of the 
Idaho Uniform Securities Act. (R., Vol. I, pp. 114-23.) Houston filed his Memorandum Regarding 
Application of Oregon Law on February26,2008. (R., Vol. I, pp. 130-38.) Ruling from the bench, 
after a telephonic hearing on February27,2008, the District Court determined that Oregon securities 
law applies and granted partial summary judgment thereon. (Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 22-27.) The court 
subsequently entered an order dismissing Houston's third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. 
(R., Vol. 1, pp. 169-70.) 
Prior to this hearing, on February 18,2008, Houston submitted a proposed judgment to the 
District Court and counsel for review. On February 21,2008, Whittier filed his Objection to the 
Form of Judgment, on the bases that: (1) it included a calculation of damages when partial summary 
judgment addressed only liability; and (2) both Oregon and Idaho securities law required tender and 
delivery of the securities at issue prior to (or at least contemporaneously with) the entry of final 
judgment. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 124-29.) On March 1 I, 2008, Houston filed an Affidavit of Robert S. 
Banks Jr. in Support of Entry of Final Judgment. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 139-43.) Whittier then made an 
Amended and Supplemental Objection to the Form of Judgment on March 12, 2008 (R., Vol. 1, 
pp. 144-53), to which Houston replied on March 18, 2008 (R., Vol. 1, pp. 154-60). The court 
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entered its Order on Entry of Judgment on March 19,2008, rejecting Whittier's objections to entry 
of summary judgment as to damages. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 161-65.) 
Final judgment in the amount of $3,234,881 .OO was entered on March 19,2008. (R., Vol. 1, 
pp. 166-68.) A Notice of Appeal was timely filed on April 28,2008. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 171-76.) 
C. Statement of Facts 
From February 2003 to the fall of 2005, Whinier was a general partner in Wood River 
Partners, LP, and the managing member of Wood River Associates, LLC, the general partner in 
Wood River Partners, LP. (Motion to Augment, Ex. B, 7 1.) Wood River had offices in Idaho and 
San Francisco. (Id., 7 3.) Houston invested in Wood River. (R., Vol. 1, p. 6.) 
Wood River fell on hard times and was placed into receivership by a federal district court in 
New York. (R., Vol. 1, p. 6.) Houston then brought his Complaint seeking recovery of his Wood 
River investments. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 5-74.) 
On February 1,2007, an indictment was brought against Whittier by the United States in the 
United States District Court, Southern District of New York ("Indictment"). (Clerk's Exhibits, 
Ex. 1, Ex. B.) Each of the counts in the Indictment were based on violations of the Federal 
Securities and Exchange Act and related to the investment by Wood River in Endwave and 
MediaBay. (Id.) On May 30,2007, Whittier entered a limited plea of guilty to certain portions of 
the Indictment, based on failing to report to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") the 
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holdings in Endwave and MediaBay as required by the Federal Securities and Exchange Act. 
(Clerk's Exhibits, Ex. 1, Ex. C.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court commit the following errors in granting Houston's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment: 
a. Granting Houston's oral request to file asubstituted affidavit of Peter Shames 
and denying the untimeliness and hearsay objections raised in Whittier's motion to strike that 
affidavit? 
b. Denying Whittier'smotion to strike Houston's untimely Reply Memorandum 
in support of motion for partial summary judgment? 
c. Making findings of fact on disputed evidence in violation of IRCP 56(c)? 
d. Applying collateral estoppel principles to determine that a limited guilty plea 
to specific federal securities violations acted as an admission to all elements of Oregon state 
securities laws? 
e. Applying Oregon law rather than Idaho law? 
2. Did the District Court commit the following errors in entering a final judgment: 
a. Granting a judgment on damages when the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment sought judgment only on liability? 
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b. Failing to require tender and delivery by Houston to Whittier of Houston's 
securities in Wood River in exchange for a final judgment? 
ARGUMENT 
This appeal arises from the District Court's grant of partial summary judgment and entry of 
final judgment against Whittier on two causes of action alleging violations of Oregon securities law. 
The District Court made several procedural errors in its grant of partial summary judgment. First, 
the District Court allowed Houston to file an affidavit in support of his Reply Memorandum. There 
is no rule allowing for such an affidavit. Regardless, it was filed and sewed less than 7 days before 
the hearing and was therefore untimely under any interpretation of Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Second, the affidavit contained inadmissible hearsay. Third, the District Court 
erred in failing to strike Houston's Reply Memorandum which was also filed and served less than 
7 days before the hearing and was therefore untimely. The final procedural error committed by the 
District Court was making findings of fact beyond that which can be established by the guilty plea 
and beyond the scope of Houston's motion for partial summary judgment. 
The District Court further erred as a matter of law. First, the District Court applied collateral 
estoppel principles based on a guilty plea to specific federal securities law violations to establish 
liability (and damages) under Oregon state securities laws. Second, the District Court applied 
Oregon, rather than Idaho, securities law. In the first error, the guilty plea to specific federal 
reporting requirements under the Federal Securities and Exchange Act does not meet the elements 
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of collateral estoppel and therefore cannot be used to establish liability under separate, state 
securities statutes. Second, under the most-significant-relationship test, used by Idaho to determine 
the applicable law, the undisputed facts and admissions by Houston establish that Idaho law, rather 
than Oregon, should have been applied.' 
The District Court also erred as a matter of law in entering a final judgment against Whittier. 
First, Houston moved for partial summary judgment only on the issue of liability. Nevertheless, the 
District Court granted a "final" judgment on damages without requiring Houston to fiIe a separate 
motion. In addition, both Oregon and Idaho securities law require the securities at issue to be 
tendered and delivered back in exchange for a judgment. The Wood River securities were not and 
have not been returned by Houston to Whittier despite receipt by Houston of portions of his alleged 
damages. (Motion to Augment, Ex. F.) 
These errors require that the grant of summary judgment be reversed and the matter 
remanded. At a minimum, the final judgment should be vacated to allow for the proper procedure 
to be followed on damages and/or with instructions to require the delivery of the Wood River 
securities to Whittier in exchange for the final judgment. 
'The failure of the District Court to determine that Idaho law applies is substantive and 
requires a reversal of summary judgment. Houston's Complaint alleges only violations of Oregon 
law and fails to allege any violations of Idaho law. Consequently, if Idaho law applies, Houston's 
Complaint fails to state a claim against Whittier and must be dismissed. 
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A. Standards of Review 
On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court employs the same standard 
used by the District Court originally ruling on the motion. Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373,374-75, 
3 P.3d 51,52-53 (2000), reh 'g denied. Surnmqjudgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). All disputed facts are liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and all 
reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record are drawn in favor of the nonmoving 
party. Kelso, 134 Idaho at 375,3 P.3d at 53. As to issues of law, this Court exercises free review 
over the District Court's decision. Bouten Const. Co. v. HF Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 
992 P.2d 751,755 (1999), reh 'g denied (2000). 
Whether collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues adjudicated in prior litigation 
between the same parties is a question of law upon which this Court exercises free review. 
Mastrangelo v. Sandstrom, Inc., 137 Idaho 844,846,55 P.3d 298,300 (2002), reh 'g denied. 
The determination and application of the appropriate choice of law is a question of law over 
which this Court exercises free review. Ryals v. StateFarm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 302,304, 
1 P.3d 803,805 (2000). 
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B. There Was No Legal or Undisputed Factual Basis for Grantine Houston's Motion for 
Partial Summaw Jud~ment 
1. The District Court Erroneouslv Based Its Grant of Partial Summaw Jud~ment 
Uoon Inadmissible Hearsav and Untimelv Filed Documents 
The hearing on Houston's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was noticed by Houston 
to be held on January 28,2008. A Declaration of Peter Shames in Support of Plaintiffs Summary 
Judgment Reply Memorandum and Houston's Reply Memorandum were not filed until January 22, 
2008. (R., Vol. 1, p. 102; Motion to Augment, Ex. C.) Both the Shames declaration and the Reply 
Memorandum were served on Whittier by Federal Express overnight mail on January 22,2008, and 
therefore were not received by Whittier until January 23,2008. (Id. See Certificates of Service.) 
Whittier moved to strike the Shames declaration and Houston's Reply Memorandum, by motion 
filed on January 24,2008, and moved to shorten time for hearing the Motion to Strike which was 
granted on January 28, 2008. (Motion to Augment, Ex. D; Ex. E; R., Vol. 1, pp. 105-06.) The 
District Court denied the motion to strike. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 110-13.) The District Court erred in 
denying the motion to strike. 
a. a v  
Memorandum 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) states that the moving party's affidavits "&&be served 
at least twenty eight (28) days before the time fixed for the hearing" and that the "moving party may 
... serve a reply brief not less than 7 days before the date of the hearing." I.R.C.P. 56(c) (emphasis 
added). The Shames declaration and the Reply Memorandum were not served until 5 days before 
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the time fixed for the hearing? The untimely Shames declaratiodaffidavit sets forth facts in support 
of partial summaryjudgment, and the Reply Memorandum makes both legal and factual arguments. 
(R., Vol. 1, pp. 102-04, 107-09; Motion to Augment, Ex. C.) Moreover, the District Court 
specifically indicated that the Shames declaratiodaffidavit would have an effect on its ruling on 
summaryjudgment. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 19.) 
This Court must determine whether the District Court properly considered the untimely 
Shames declaratiodaffidavit and Reply Memorandum before it addresses the correctness of the 
District Court's decision. If the District Court should not have considered the untimely documents, 
then the grant of partial summary judgment should be reversed. Rule 56(c) required Houston to 
serve the Shames declaratiodaffidavit, along with his initial brief, not less than 28 days before the 
hearing and to serve the Reply Memorandum not less than 7 days before the hearing. I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
It is undisputed that Houston failed to timely file either document. So, the issue is whether it was 
error for the District Court to consider them. 
'The untimely nature of the Shames declaration was exacerbated by the fact that Houston 
served a declaration rather than an affidavit as required by the rules. I.R.C.P. 56(c). A declaration 
is not equivalent to an affidavit and may not be used to present facts andlor evidence in support of 
or opposition to amotion for summaryjudgment. See Bennett v. Weimar, 975 P.2d 691,696 (Alaska 
1999) ("Absent le~slative requirement that we do so, we are not willing to eauate an unswom . . - 
declaration with an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment proceedings."). Whittier's motion 
sought to strike the Shames declaration based on its failure to comvlv with the affidavit reauirement. - - .  
However, Houston made an oral request at the hearing to substitute the declaration with an affidavit, 
which the court granted. Consequently, the supporting affidavit was not timely served 28 days 
before the hearing but, instead, was not "served" until the day of the hearing. 
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On January 23,2008, leaving Whittier without an opportunity to respond, Houston served 
the Shames declaration, for the first time raising new "facts" regarding summary judgment. While 
Rule 56(e) gives the District Court discretion to allow a party to oppose or supplement an affidavit 
by further affidavits, the time limitations set forth in Rule 56(c) still apply unless the court shortens 
the time for good cause shown. I.R.C.P. 56(c), 56(e). The problem here is that the Shames 
declaratiodaffidavit was not a supplement to an earlier factual showing made in support of 
Houston's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment but, rather, presented new and different factual 
information. Moreover, the information contained in Shames' declaratiodaffidavit was clearly 
known and available to Houston prior to filing his motion, and there was no reason given why the 
affidavit could not have been timely filed. There was no motion to shorten time or otherwise request 
relief from the time limits of Rule 56(c). Nor was there a showing of good cause for failing to 
comply with the time limits. Clearly, the District Court should not have considered Shames' 
declaratiodaffidavit or Reply Memorandum and erred when it failed to grant the motion to strike 
them both as untimely. 
b. The Untimelv Shames DeclarationIAffidavit Contained Inadmissible 
Hearsav Which Should Have Been Stricken 
"In considering the evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment 'a court will consider only that material contained in affidavits or depositions 
which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial."' Ryan v. Beisner, 
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123 Idaho 42,45,844 P.2d 24,27 (Ct.App. 1992) (quoting Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 
92 Idaho 865, 869,452 P.2d 362,366 (1969); I.R.C.P. 56(e)) (emphasis added). 
[I]f the admissibility of evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment is raised by the court on its own motion or on objection by 
one of the parties, the court must first make a threshold determination as to the 
admissibility of the evidence before proceeding to the ultimate issue, whether 
summary judgment is appropriate. 
Ryan, 123 Idaho at 45,844 P.2d at 27 (italics added). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides 
in pertinent part that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." I.R.C.P. 56(e) (italics added). 
As a general rule, evidence which falls within the definition of hearsay is inadmissible. 
I.R.E. 802. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. I.R.E. 801(c). The Shames 
declaratiodaffidavit contains inadmissible hearsay which should have been stricken. 
Specifically, paragraph 2 of the Shames declaratiodaffidavit purports to be based upon Peter 
Shames' review of the Affidavit of Howard Houston in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 103; 108.) The Affidavit of Howard Houston, however, is an 
out-of-court statement, other than one made by Shames, which is being offered to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. The statements contained in paragraph 2 of the Shames declaratiodaffidavit 
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clearly fall within the definition of hearsay as outlined by I.R.E. 801(c). No exception was offered, 
making these statements inadmissible, and they should have been stricken. 
Similarly, the first sentence of paragraph 3 of the Shames declaratiodaffidavit states, 
"Mr. Houston made eight different installment investments in Wood River, as described in his 
affidavit." (Id. (italics added).) The third sentence of paragraph 3 states that "in each instance, 
Mr. Houston agreed or offered to make the investment from Oregon." (Id.) The above statements 
are also hearsay because they relate to out-of-court statements or actions purportedly made by 
Houston and offered by Peter Shames, on behalf of Houston, to prove the truth of a matter asserted. 
Accordingly, these statements are inadmissible hearsay and should have been stricken. 
Failing to strike and relying upon the Shames declaratiodaffidavit and the Reply 
Memorandum necessitates a reversal of summary judgment. 
2. District Court Erred in ma kin^ Its Findings of Fact and Determinine That 
Houston Was Entitled to Partial Summarv Jud~ment as a Matter of Law Based 
on Collateral Estoooet 
Houston moved for partial summary judgment on his first and second causes of action 
alleging violations of Oregon securities law. (R., Vol. 1, p. 89.) Houston sought summaryjudgment 
based on Whittier's failure to deny the allegations in the Complaint by taking the Fifth Amendment 
and through his guilty plea in a criminal case. 
Although the District Court determined that taking the Fifth Amendment did not constitute 
an admission to the allegations in the Complaint, it granted partial summary judgment on the first 
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and second causes of action by applying collateral estoppel principles and determining that 
Whittier's guilty plea in the federal securities case established each of the elements of liability 4 
damages for violations of Oregon securities law. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 66, 67, 69.) The issue then is 
whether the District Court properly applied collateral estoppel in granting summary judgment on 
liability and damages. If not, and since summary judgment was granted solely on the basis of 
collateral estoppel, summary judgment should be reversed and the case remanded. 
This Court requires five elements to exist in order to allow Whittier's guilty plea in the 
criminal case to have any conclusive effect in the current civil matter: 
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; 
(2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in 
the present action; 
(3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; 
(4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and 
(5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity to a party 
in the litigation. 
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007). If any single element is 
missing, collateral estoppel cannot be used. Id. 
Thebasis for Houston'sMotion for Partial Summaryludgment and theDistrict Court's grant 
of that motion was that Whittier's guilty plea to Counts 1, 2, and 4 of the federal Indictment 
prevented Whittier from having a civil trial on the allegations that he violated Oregon securities law 
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and that the guilty plea was conclusive as to 4 elements of those Oregon statutes. However, the 
District Court erred in determining that the guilty plea met elements 2 and 3 of the collateral estoppel 
test4 
The Indictment contained four counts: Count 1-securities fraud relating to the acquisition 
of Endwave stock by Wood River; Count ;?-failure to disclose ownership in excess of 5 percent of 
Endwave stock; Count 3-failure to disclose ownership in excess of 10 percent of Endwave stock; 
and Count &failure to disclose ownership in excess of 10 percent of MediaBay stock. (Certificate 
of Exhibits, Ex. 1, Ex. B.) Count 1 of the Indictment was based in part on "acquiring beneficial 
ownership of greater than 70 percent of the common stock of a publicly traded company, Endwave, 
without disclosing WHITTIER'S beneficial ownership interest through required filings with the 
SEC." (Id., Ex. B at 3-4.) Count 1 of the Indictment alleges violations of $$13(d)(l) and 16(a)(l) 
and related rules of the Federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 which require, subject to 
certain limitations, any person who acquires a beneficial ownership of more than 5 percent (or 
10 percent) of the stock of an issuer to file a statement with the SEC describing, among other things, 
the number of shares beneficially owned. (Id. at 8-9.) 
Count 2 of the Indictment specifically alleged acquisition of more than 5 percent of Endwave 
stock and failure to file the required SEC statement in violation of Rule 13(d)(l) of the Federal 
Securities and Exchange Act. (Id. at 17.) 
4Whittier does not contest elements 1,4, or 5 on appeal. Nevertheless, collateral estoppel 
does not apply if any one of the five elements is not met. Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. 
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Count 3 of the Indictment alleged ownership of more than 10 percent of Endwave stock and 
failure to file the required SEC report in violation of $16(a)(l) of the Federal Securities and 
Exchange Act. (Id. at 18.) 
Count 4 of the Indictment alleged a beneficial ownership of more than 20 percent of the 
outstanding common stock of MediaBay and a failure to file the necessary SEC filing report in 
violation of $16 of the Federal Securities and Exchange Act. (Id. at 18- 19.) 
Whittier pled guilty only to Counts 1,2, and 4. (Certificate of Exhibits, Ex. 1, Ex. C, p. 2.) 
With respect to Counts 1,2, and 4, the record establishes that theonly specific acts to which Whittier 
admitted guilt were failing to timely file forms with the SEC disclosing his beneficial ownership in 
Endwave and MediaBay: 
THE COURT: Then Mr. Whittier, tell me in your own words what it is you 
did that makes you guilty of these crimes. 
THE DEFENDANT: I was a general partner of Wood River Partners from 
February 2003 through the fall of 2005 and Wood River Offshore from July 2005 
through the fall of 2005. In that capacity I engaged in wronghl conduct, including 
intentionally concealing the size of my beneficial ownership position in a public 
company named Endwave corporation. I purchased and sold Endwave stock 
knowing that the truethe truth regarding my Endwave holdings was material 
information that was not publicly known. 
In the course of conducting these trades I used telephones, faxes and the 
internet. 
As general partner of both funds, I misled my investors in several ways. For 
example, I knowingly and intentionally failed to cause the timely filing of forms with 
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the SEC pursuant to Rules 13d-1 and 16a, disclosing that I beneficially owned in 
excess of 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively, of shares of Endwave. 
Further, the undisclosed concentrated position in the Endwave security far 
exceeded the maximum cap for a single stock provided for in the fund's stated 
investment parameters. 
In addition, in the summer of 2005 I caused a false filing of a Schedule 13D- 
G form, which did not accurately disclose the complete and correct beneficial 
ownership I have of a company called MediaBay. At the time of the filing I knew 
that this was material information .... 
(Id. at 14-15.) It is based upon this limited guilty plea that the District Court granted summary 
judgment to Houston on each and every element, including damages, of the Oregon securities 
statutes set forth in Counts 1 and 2 of his Complaint. This was error for the following reasons: 
(1) nothing in Whittier's guilty plea established any liability to Houstonunder any Oregon securities 
statutes (or Idaho securities statutes for that matter); (2) nothing in Whittier's guilty plea established 
that Houston "was unaware of the untrue statements and omissions when he made his purchases" 
of Wood River securities, a factual finding made by the District Court in support of its grant of 
summaryjudgment (R., Vol. 1, pp. 1 1 1-12); and (3) nothing in Whittier's guilty plea established the 
purchase by, sale to, or amount of damages suffered by Houston as a result of any alleged violation 
of any securities law. 
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a. Whittier's Guiltv Plea to Soecific Filing Reauirements Under the Federal 
Securities and Exchan~e Act Does Not Meet Element 2 of the Collateral 
Estoouel Test With Resoect to Liabilitv Under Oregon State Securities 
Statutes 
Element 2 requires that the issue decided in the prior litigation be identical to the issue 
presented in the present action. Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124,157 P.3d at 618. The issue presented in the 
present action is whether Whittier's guilty plea to violating specific reporting requirements 
established by the Federal Securities and Exchange Act is identical to Whittier's alleged liability 
(and Houston's damages) under specific Oregon state securities statutes. Houston's Complaint does 
not seek any relief based on violations of any federal securities laws. Nor do the Oregon state 
securities statutes forming the basis of Counts 1 and 2 of Houston's Complaint require the filing of 
any reports regarding beneficial ownership in a particular stock once it reaches the 5- or 10-percent 
level. In other words, it is not a violation of the Oregon state securities statutes for Whittier to have 
failed to file these SEC-required reports. 
In the present action, Houston alleges violations of only ORS 59.135, 59.137, and 
59.1 15(1)(b). (R., Vol. 1, pp. 5-25.) Section 59.135 relates to fraud with respect to securities and 
provides, in its entirety, as follows: 
59.135 Fraud and deceit with respect to securities or securities business. It is 
unlawhl for anyperson, directly or indirectly, inconnection with the purchase or sale 
of any security or the conduct of a securities business or for any person who receives 
any consideration from another person primarily for advising the other person as to 
the value of securities or their purchase or sale, whether through the issuance of 
analyses or reports or otherwise: 
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(1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; 
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading; 
(3) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; or 
(4) To make or file, or cause to be made or filed, to or with the Director of the 
Department of Consumer and Business Services any statement, report or document 
which is known to be false in any material respect or matter. 
ORS 59.1 35. Section 59.137 addresses liability and damages in connection with a violation of ORS 
59.135, and is not a separate basis for recovery. See ORS 59.137. Similarly, ORS 59.115(1)(b) 
relates to liability for violations of ORS 59.135. That section provides as follows: 
59.1 15 Liability in connection with sale or successful solicitationof saleof securities; 
recovery by purchaser; limitations on proceeding; attorney fees. (1) A person is liable 
as provided in subsection (2) of this section to a purchaser of a security if the person: 
(b) Sells or successfully solicits the sale of a security in violation of ORS 59.135 (1) 
or (3) or by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading (the buver not knowing of 
the untruth or omission), and who does not sustain the burden of proof that the 
person did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, 
of the untruth or omission. 
ORS 59.1 15(1)@) (emphasis added). On the other hand, provisions of the Federal Securities and 
Exchange Act to which Whittier pled guilty specifically require the failing of specific reports 
disclosing beneficial ownership. @13(d)(l) and 16(a)(l). 
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In the context of whether a prior criminal guilty plea can act as collateral estoppel, or issue 
preclusion, in a subsequent civil action depends on what the prior guilty plea decided and the import 
on the instant civil action of that which was decided in the criminal matter. Anderson v. City of 
Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,185,731 P.2d 171,180 (1986). An examination of Whittier's guilty plea 
demonstrates that none of the elements of a violation of Oregon state securities statutes was put at 
issue. The only factual issue decided in the criminal matter was that Whittier failed to file certain 
reports with the SEC. However, that does not conclusively establish any of the elements of the 
Oregon state securities statutes, especially when none of those statutes makes it a requirement that 
Whittier file those reports. Certainly, any failure to file a federal SEC report fails to establish 
securities fraud as to Houston. There are no allegations that Houston was monitoring those reports, 
had access to them, or even knew about those reports so that their absence would have had some 
impact upon Houston's investments or established fraud specific as to him. 
Element 2 of the collateral estoppel test requires, the issue decided in the federal criminal 
matter must be identical to the issues presented in this civil action. The exactness of the issues 
necessary to meet this element was well demonstrated by this Court in Navarro v. Yonkers, 
144 Idaho 882, 173 P.3d 1141 (2007). In Navarro, a stipulated guardianship order from a prior 
proceeding determined that Yonkers was unfit to be a parent of two of her children, Brandon and 
Justin. 144 Idaho at 886, 173 P.3d at 1145. Nevertheless, this Court refhsed to apply collateral 
estoppel to the present, pending guardianship matter because the issue in the present case was 
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whether Yonkers was fit to be a parent to a different child, Jessica. Id. Despite dealing with the 
same generic topic (parental fitness), the Court refused to apply collateral estoppel because the 
present issue was not identical. Id. Similarly, although the criminal and civil matters involved here 
both generically deal with securities fraud, the issues raised in the civil action are not identical. 
Element 2 regarding the identity of issues necessary between the prior and present litigation 
was also addressed by this Court in Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Anderson Logging Co., 126 Idaho 
648, 889 P.2d 82 (1995), in which this Court determined that the second factor of the collateral 
estoppel test had not been met. 126 Idaho at 653, 889 P.2d at 87. This Court held that the issue 
decided in the prior Oregon action was not identical to the issue in the then-present Idaho action 
"even though both fall under the generic label of 'conflict of laws."' Id. The Court determined that 
the conflict-of-laws issues presented in the two actions, as well as the legal standards to be used in 
resolving them, were not identical. Id. (citing Peterson v. ClarkLeasing Corp., 451 F.2d 1291,1292 
(9th Cir. 1971) (issues are not identical if the second action involves application of a different legal 
standard, even though the factual setting of both suits is the same) (citing 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE $0.443[2])). Likewise, here, although the prior federal criminal action and the present 
state securities action could fall under the generic label of "securities fraud," the legal standards to 
be used in resolving each are not identical. As previously discussed, the Federal Securities and 
Exchange Act and the Oregon securities statutes are different in their general provisions; more 
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specifically, there are no reporting requirements in the Oregon state statutes meaning that a different 
legal standard would be applied to determine fraud under the state statutes. 
b. Whittier's Guiltv Plea in the Pederal Criminal Matter Does Not Violate 
Oregon State Securities Statutes andThereforeDoes Not Meet Element 3 
of the Collateral Estovvel Test 
(1) Houston's State of M i d  Was Never Decided in the Criminal 
Matter 
Element 3 of the collateral estoppel test requires that the issue sought to be precluded be 
actually decided in the prior litigation. Oregon securities statutes require that the buyer not know 
of the untruth or omission of the allegedly false statement used to sell or solicit the sale of a security. 
ORS 59.1 15(1)(b). In other words, there is no violation of Oregon state securities statutes unless it 
is proved that the buyer (here, Houston) did not know of the untruth or omission of the alleged 
misrepresentation. As a cornerstone to its order granting summary judgment, the District Court 
made the following finding of fact: "Plaintiff was unaware of the untrue statements and omissions 
when he made his purchases." (R., Vol. 1, p. 112.) Nothing in the Indictment or Whittier's plea of 
guilty mentions, let alone establishes, that Houston was unaware or aware of the untrue statements 
and omissions that formed the basis of either the Indictment or the guilty plea. Because this issue 
was never actually decided in the federal criminal matter and, further, because it is a required 
element for a violation of the Oregon securities statutes, collateral estoppel cannot be used to 
conclusively establish Whittier's liability under Oregon securities statutes. Because the only ground 
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for summary judgment was the preclusive effect of the guilty plea on the present action, Houston's 
awareness, or lack thereof, of the untrue nature of the statements and omissions when he made his 
purchases was never established, and therefore, summary judgment was granted in error. 
(2) Houston's Damages Were Never Decided bv Whittier's Guilty 
Plea in the Federal Securities Criminal Matter 
Likewise, nothing in the Indictment or Whittier's guilty plea established any of the following 
facts necessary for Houston to prove entitlement to damages under the Oregon securities laws: 
(1) the dates of any alleged purchases of securities in Wood River; 
(2) the amount of money invested; 
(3) the number of securities purchased; 
(4) the amount of damages; 
(5) whether prejudgment interest is allowed; 
(6)  if so, the rate of prejudgment interest; and 
(7) any setoffs for payments made by other allegedly responsible third parties 
(including Houston's own broker and Seward & Kissel). 
Because element 3 of the collateral estoppel test requires that the issue sought to be precluded in the 
present action be actually decided in the prior matter and further because none of these damage 
issues was decided (or even mentioned) in the prior criminal matter, collateral estoppel cannot be 
used, as it was by the District Court, to grant summaryjudgment regardingdamages. Merely setting 
forth allegedly undisputed facts does not make those facts material for purposes of summary 
judgment when the legal principle used (here, collateral estoppel) to make those facts "undisputed" 
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fails. The burden to show genuine issues of material fact did not shift to Whittier when Houston's 
motion sought, as a matter of law, to establish these "undisputed facts" through collateral estoppel. 
3. Ore~on Law Does Not ADD~V. and Therefore. Granting Houston's Motion for 
Summarv Jud~ment Was Reversible Error 
Houston's Complaint sought damages for violation of Oregon securities laws. (R., Vol. 1, 
pp. 5, 12-22.) Houston did not allege any violation of Idaho securities law or any violation of the 
Federal Securities and Exchange AcL5 Houston moved for summary judgment solely on the basis 
of Oregon securities law. (R., Vol. 1, p. 89.)6 The District Court granted summary judgment based 
on Oregon law as follows: 
d. If the court determines that the Oregon securities laws apply to the 
sales to Plaintiff, then Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment against Defendant 
John H. Whittier on Plaintiffs first and second claims for relief, for violations of 
ORS 59.135(2) and ORS 59.115(1)(b), both of which make it unlawful to sell 
securities by means of untrue statements of material fact and omissions to state 
material facts. 
(R., Vol. 1, p. 112.) The court reserved for further proceedings the question of whether Oregon or 
Idaho law applied to the sales to Houston. (Id.) During a telephonic hearing on the choice-of-law 
'Failing to allege violations of the Federal Securities and Exchange Act is fatal to the 
application of collateral estoppel, as discussed above. In addition, by only alleging application of 
Oregon law Houston was able to avoid removal to federal court and potential transfer to New York 
by co-defendant Seward & Kissel. 
6'LHouston ow moves for partial summary judgment on his first and second claims for relief 
against Defendant John Hunting Whittier, which alleges violation of Oregon's securities law 
$5 ORS 59.115, ORS 59.135 and ORS 59.137." (R.,Vol. 1,p. 89.) 
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issue the District Court determined (confirmed) its belief that Oregon law applied and that summary 
judgment was therefore appropriate. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 27.) 
"Where all acts essential to a sale or transfer of securities take place in one state only, the 
transaction is governed by the securities law of that state; but where the acts are performed in several 
different states it is necessary to apply conflict of law principles to determine which state's securities 
law will control." 79A C.J.S. SECURITIES REGULATION fj 367. "Idaho applies the 'most significant 
relationship test' as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS fj 145 in 
determiningthe applicable law." Grover v. Isom, 137 Idaho 770,772-73,53 P.3d 821 (2002), reh 'g 
denied. 
The goal of this test is to identify the state most significantly related to a particular 
issue and to apply its law to resolve that issue. In doing so, the court first identifies 
various factual contacts between the transaction or parties and the interested states. 
It then evaluates these contacts in light of certain broad policy concerns. However, 
the relevant factual contacts and the importance of particular policy concerns vary 
depending upon the nature of the substantive issues implicated by the underlying 
dispute. 
Seubert, 126 Idaho 648,651,889 P.2d 82 (1995). In this case, the District Court agreed that Idaho 
had the most significant contacts. 
So in looking at significant contacts, if that was the only question, or if I have to 
apply the law of the most significant contacts, if I have to, then I would say Idaho law 
applies. 
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(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 24.) However, the District Court felt that it could ignore the most significant- 
relationship test, because this was a securities case, and instead apply 
the law of the state in which the offer to sell is made .... My determination is that I 
do not have to chose the most significant, the state with the most significant 
relationship .... So my determination, my ruling will be that the law of Oregon can 
apply to this situation. It's a securities transaction. The offer was made, that's 
undisputed, in Oregon. 
(Id. at 25-26.) 
The District Court was correct in finding that Idaho had the most significant relationship to 
the securities transactions at issue. Houston's judicial admissions in affidavits and memoranda filed 
with theDistrict Court establishes that the Idaho Uniform Securities Act applies to Houston's claims 
for alleged securities  violation^.^ Houston has already admitted that "[hlis injury occurred 
Idaho...." (Certificate of Exhibits, Ex. 3, Ex. A, p. 14 (emphasis added).) Houston also admits that 
his "[mloney was lost in Idaho, as a result of actions taken in Idaho." (Id., Ex. A, p. 15 (emphasis 
added).) Houston's admission that he was injured in Idaho, rather than Oregon, strongly supports 
the application of the Idaho Uniform Securities Act in this case. 
Similarly, Houston admits that the conduct allegedly causing his injury occurred in Idaho, 
not Oregon. In particular, Houston asserts that his investment in Wood River "was mismanaged 
fi." (Certificate of Exhibits, Ex. 3, Ex. A, p. 14 (emphasis added).) In fact, a majority of 
7Houston made each of these admissions in order to establish jurisdiction in Idaho over 
Seward & Kissel, a defendant seeking to be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
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securities purchases and sales on behalf of the Wood River entities were made in Whittier's offices 
in Idaho. (See Motion to Augment, Ex. B, 7 6.) Thus, there is no dispute between the parties that 
the conduct alleged to have caused Houston injury occurred in Idaho, not Oregon. 
The record fkther reflects that Whittier is a resident of Hailey, Blaine County, Idaho, and 
resided in Blaine County at all material times at issue in this case. (R., Vol. 1, p. 39, 6.) While 
Houston purports to be a resident of Oregon, he admits that he has been coming to Idaho, and in 
particular the Wood River Valley, on a regular basis for over 30 years, that he plans to retire in the 
Wood River Valley, and that the Wood River connection was important to his decision to agree to 
review the Wood River fund for a possible investment. (Certificate of Exhibits, Ex. 3, Ex. B, 7 2.) 
I always understood that Wood River was an investment based in Idaho. That was 
imuortant to me. I am an outdoorsman and have been coming to the Wood River 
Valley on a regular basis over thirty years. My father was born in Idaho, and it is an 
area that I know well. I plan to retire there, and have consulted with realtors about 
buying a retirement homi in the Wood River Valley. The Wood River connection 
was important to mv decision to amee to review the fund for a possible investment 
in the first place. 
(Id. at Ex. B, 7 2 (emphasis added).) Those facts also favor the application of Idaho law based on 
Whittier's residence and Houston's substantial contacts with Idaho for more than 30 years. 
Moreover, the Confidential Private Offering Memorandum, upon which Houston purportedly 
based his decision to invest in Wood River, specifically states that Wood River would engage in 
business in Idaho and would be taxed in Idaho. (Certificate of Exhibits, Ex. 2, Ex. B, p. 25.) 
Houston acknowledges that fact by admitting that Wood River was located and operated in Idaho, 
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that the portfolio was managed in Idaho, that funds were collected from investors in Idaho, and that 
records were maintained in Idaho. (Id. at Ex. 3, Ex. A, p. 7 (emphasis added).) 
In addition, Houston acknowledges that he requested a meeting with Whinier in Ketchum, 
Idaho, in late September 2005 and that he discussed meeting with Whinier in Ketchum, Idaho, on 
prior occasions. (Id., Ex. B, 7 3; see also Ex. C, 7 5.) Houston also admits he traveled to Ketchum, 
Idaho, to meet with Whittier on October 7,2005, for the purpose of reviewing Wood River's books. 
(Id., Ex. B, 3; see also Ex. C, 7 5.) Houston also acknowledges that all communications with 
Wood River representatives were at Wood River's offices in Ketchum and that all correspondence 
from Wood River was sent to Houston andlor his assistant from Wood River's offices in Ketchum. 
(Id., Ex. C ,  7 4.) 
In this case, Houston admits that he was allegedly injured in Idaho, that the conduct allegedly 
causing his injury occurred in Idaho, and that his relationship with Whittier was centered in Idaho. 
(Id., Exs. A-C (emphasis added).) Those statements constitute judicial admissions. Based on 
Houston's admissions and the undisputed facts Idaho has the most significant relationship to this 
case, and the District Court should have determined that the Idaho Uniform Securities Act applied, 
not the Oregon Revised Statutes. 
The District Court committed error, however, in deciding to ignore the most-significant- 
relationship test in favor of a previously unrecognized exception relating to securities cases. This 
Court has determined that when the contacts and factors are considered and the most-significant- 
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relationship test points to the application of a state's law, that law be applied. See Ryals, 
134 Idaho at 302,l P.3d at 806 ("The aggregation of factors support[s] the conclusion that Idaho has 
the most significant relationship with the transaction and the parties involved here. Idaho law will 
therefore be applied to interpret Ryals' State F a m  insurance policy." (emphasis added)). In 
Draper v. Draper, 1 15 Idaho 973,772 P.2d 180 (1989), this Court noted that: 
Here, the trial court acknowledged that Oregon was the principal location of the risk 
"and the state with the most significant relationship." However, the trial court 
concluded that "these factors are outweighed by Idaho's public policy concerning 
family members and uniformity in requiring the same mandatory insurance of 
persons using Idaho's highways." 
115 Idaho at 975,772 P.2d at 182. In Draper, this Court ruled that it was "not able to accept the 
public policy considerations that the trial court weighed against the choice of Oregon law .... Without 
any public policy to counterbalance the choice of Oregon law under the most significant relationship 
test, we can only conclude that Oregon law applies here." 115 Idaho at 976,772 P.2d at 183. Here, 
the District Court also determined that Idaho was the state with the most significant relationship but 
nevertheless determined that "theimportance of particular policy concerns" with respect to securities 
transactions outweigh these factors and determined, instead, that Oregon law applies. (Tr., Vol. 2, 
pp. 24-26.) Like Draper, there is no established public policy in either Oregon or Idaho that the 
location of the purchaser of a security trumps all other significant factors or relationships. 
Consequently, once the District Court determined (correctly) that Idaho had the most significant 
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relationship to the transactions and parties, it was required to apply Idaho law. Its failure to do so 
was error.' 
C. The District Court Erred in Entering a Final Judgment for Damayes 
Regardless of this Court's determination regarding the application of collateral estoppel or 
choice of law, the District Court should not have entered a judgment for damages. 
1. Houston Did Not Move for Summaw Jud~ment on Damapes 
A review of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and supporting Memorandum 
establishes that the motion relates exclusively to the issue of liability and that Houston did not seek 
summary judgment on damages? In particular, Houston failed to acknowledge anywhere in his 
motion or supporting memorandum that he sought to recover damages or prejudgment interest from 
Whittier. Instead, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment sought to establish Whittier's 
for alleged statutory violations relating to Houston's investment in Wood River based on 
collateral estoppel. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is based on Whittier's guilty 
*If Idaho law applies, then Houston's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should have 
been denied by the District Court because Houston's Complaint alleges only violations of Oregon 
securities law and fails to place Whittier on notice of any alleged violation of Idaho securities law. 
Consequently, the grant of summary judgment should be vacated on these grounds alone. This is 
especially true given the District Court's acknowledgment that it did no analysis under Idaho law 
when it granted summary judgment. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 25.) 
9The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment may be pursued strictly 
on the issue of liability, leaving damages to be considered at trial or in a separate motion. See 
I.R.C.P. 56(d). 
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plea to Counts 1,2, and 4 of the Indictment, which Houston argued is tantamount to an admission 
of liabilitv to all prima facie elements of Counts 1 and 2 set forth in Houston's Complaint. 
However, the record in this case establishes that the criminal matter did not address Houston 
specifically and most assuredly did not address Houston's alleged damages, tender of the security, 
the amount of damages, or prejudgment interest. (See id.) Since neither PlaintifPs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment nor Whittier's guilty plea upon which that motion is based addressed 
Houston's alleged damages, it was premature to consider, let alone enter, any judgment regarding 
damages, let alone the one proposed by Houston. Houston should have been required to prove his 
alleged damages and entitlement thereto before a judgment was entered. 
Houston moved for partial summaryjudgment based on the principles of collateral estoppel, 
and, as made clear in his moving papers, the focus was strictly on the liability elements of the 
Oregon securities statutes. Houston did not cite to any portion of the Oregon Revised Statutes 
relating to damage, nor did he make any argument that collateral estoppel extended to damages. Nor 
did Houston make any argument or cite to any statute or case law regarding the calculation and 
determination of the amount of damages. Although Houston may have made general statements of 
"undisputed facts" from which damages could theoretically be determined, the burden of disputing 
damages or establishing genuine issues of material fact regarding damages never shiRed to Whittier 
given the collateral estoppel, liability only, focus of Houston's motion. Granting summaryjudgment 
on damages was reversible error. Accordingly, this Court should reverse entry of judgment for 
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damages and remand for Houston to prove that he has met the statutory prerequisite to damages, the 
amount thereof, and related issues at trial or through a follow-up motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
2. Houston Was Not Entitled to a Judgment on Dama~es. as a Matter of Law, 
Absent Tender of the Wood River Securities Back to Whittier 
Oregon law provides that a purchaser of securities may pursue an action to recover the 
consideration paid by the purchaser for the security. See ORS 59.1 15(2)(a). This is the type of 
action pursued by Houston. However, before a purchaser can recover the consideration paid for the 
security under that statute, ORS 59.1 15(2)(a) requires that the purchaser of a security tender the 
security back to the seller as a prerequisite to a judgment." 
Houston failed to tender his interest in Wood River Partners, L.P., which is a prerequisite to 
recovering consideration paid for a security under ORS 59.1 15(2)(a). "The Uniform Securities Act, 
Revised Uniform Securities Act, andmost blue sky statutes provide that a p u r c h a s e r m  tender the 
security, the sale of which is the basis of a civil action, & to t h e m  ofjudgment in a civil action 
for rescission." 69A AM. JUR. 2D SECURITIES REGULATION- STATE $224 (emphasis added). "The 
tender of securities is an absolute precondition to recovery under the rescission provisions of the blue 
sky laws." Id. (emphasis added). "The tender of securities is required in that the statute attempts 
to provide for rescissionary damages and there are only two types of remedies permissible: 
"Idaho law has a similar requirement. 
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(1) rescission, where the purchaser holds the securities; and (2) damages for out-of-pocket losses, 
where the purchaser has sold the securities." Id. Here, Houston still holds the securities and has not 
sold them. 
"The blue sky laws do not permit the purchaser to elect to retain the securities & seek 
damages." Id. (emphasis added). In fact, courts have dismissed securities actions for rescission 
where the buyer of the security chooses to retain the security and seek damages. See Windswept 
Corp. v. Fisher, 683 F.Supp. 233,239 (W.D. Wash. 1988) ("Because plaintiffs chose to retain the 
stock and seek damages, their claim pursuant to the Securities Act of Washington must be 
dismissed.") In support of that holding, the court acknowledged that, "[Tlhere is no liability for an 
illegal or fraudulent sale under this statute" where the buver chooses to retain the stock ..." Id. 
(citation omitted; emphasis added). 
Similar to the laws of Washington, the law of Oregon clearly provides that tender of the 
security is a prerequisite to recovering compensation paid for the security. Specifically, ORS 
59.11 5(2)(a) states as follows: 
"The relevant portion of the Washington securities statute, RCW 21.20.430, provides that 
a person who has purchased securities "may sue either at law or equity ... uDon the tender of the 
m, or for damages if he or she no longer owns the security." See Windswept Corp., 683 
F.Supp. at 239 (emphasis added). ORS 59.1 15(2)(a) contains the identical emphasized language. 
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(2) The purchaser may recover: 
(a) U ~ o n  tender of the security, the consideration paid for the security, and 
interest from the date of payment equal to the greater of the rate of interest specified 
in ORS 82.010 for judgments for the payment of money or the rate provided in the 
security if the security is an interest-bearing obligation, less any amount received on 
the security. 
ORS 59.1 15(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
In this case, Houston's cause of action under ORS 59.11 5(2)(a) is an action for rescissionary 
damages rather than out-of-pocket losses. In spite of the clear language of ORS 59- 1 15(2)(a), as well 
as the law from jurisdictions with similar statutes requiring tender of the security in actions for 
rescission of a security, Houston argued the term "tender" as used in ORS 59.1 15(2)(a) does not 
require him to deliver the security to Whittier before he can get a judgment under ORS 59- 
1 15(2)(a).I2 (R., Vol. 1, pp. 140-41.) 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon also addressed the issue and specifically held that a party 
seeking rescission under ORS 59.1 15(2)(a) must tender the security before the consideration paid 
for the security can be recovered. Metal Tech Corp. v. Metal Teckniques Co., Znc., 703 P.2d 237, 
242 (0r.App. 1985). Specifically, the Court of Appeals of Oregon held "[Ilf defendants prevail on 
12Houston also argues that tender does not mean deliver, so that he met any tender 
requirement by conditionally tendering the security, but only agreeing to deliver them after judgment 
has been entered and fullv satisfied. However, any reasonable interpretation of tender, as used in 
the Oregon statute, contemplates physical delivery and retum of the securities before and in 
exchange for a judgment. See BLACK'S DICTIONARY (8th ed.) (tender-an unconditional offer of 
money or performance to satisfy a debt or obligation (emphasis added)). 
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their counterclaim alleging plaintiffs' violation of the Oregon Securities Law, thev must tender their 
shares to lolaintiffl in order to recover the consideration oaid for them. ORS 59.11 5(2)." Id. 
(emphasis added). If that occurs, [plaintiff] will reacauire stock in the corporation in the course of 
this litigation.") Id. (emphasis added). The foregoing language demonstrates that tender of the 
security does require actual delivery of the security to the seller. 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon went on to state that "AAer tender of the security, a 
successful plaintiff may recover the consideration paid, plus interest." Id. at 243, citing ORS 
59.1 15(2)(a). Moreover, the holding in Metal Tech has been analyzed and interpreted to stand for 
the proposition that, "Tender is a necessarv orecondition to recovering consideration paid." THEY 
TOIL NOT, NEITHER DO THEY SPW: CNIL LIABILITY UNDER THE OREGON SECURITIES LAW, 37 
Willamette L. Rev. 335,388 (Spring2001) (citing Metal Tech, 703 P.2d at 242) (emphasis added)). 
The District Court allowed Houston to take judgment against Whittier without requiring him 
to give back the Wood River securities. Oregon law (and Idaho law) specifically prohibits such 
actions. Houston's failure to tender the security to Whittier, which is a condition precedent under 
the specific terms of ORS 59.1 15(2)(a), precluded Houston from recovering any of the consideration 
paid for the security. Therefore, no judgment should have been entered against Whittier until 
Houston first delivers the securities back to Whittier.I3 
I3Further proof of the District Court's error in a judgment on damages without 
requiring Houston to return the securities at issue is evidenced by the partial satisfaction of the 
judgment by other responsible parties. (Motion to Augment, Ex. F.) Houston has received $600,000 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court's grant of summary judgment to Houston was procedurally and 
substantively in error. The District Court abused its discretion in allowing and relying upon the 
untimely Shames declarationlaffidavit and untimely Reply Memorandum in granting summary 
judgment. These documents should have been stricken, and failure to do so is reversible error. 
Substantively, the District Court erred in applying collateral estoppel as the sole grounds for 
conclusively establishing all of the elements for liability (and damages) under Oregon securities law. 
Whittier's guilty plea in the federal criminal securities action did not address the identical issues 
presented in the civil action, and the issues sought to be precluded: (1) securities fraud beyond 
violating SEC reporting requirements; (2) Houston's knowledge (or lack thereof) of the truth of the 
alleged representation or omission; and (3) Houston's damages were never actually decided by the 
guilty plea in the prior criminal action. Without the proper application of collateral estoppel the sole 
basis for granting summary judgment fails, requiring a reversal and remand. Moreover, despite 
recognizing that the application of the most-significant-relationship test identified Idaho's law as the 
applicable law, the District Court chose to apply Oregon law. That choice was error as a matter of 
law requiring a reversal of summary judgment which was granted solely on an analysis of Oregon 
law. Finally, at a minimum, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on damages. 
toward the principal damage amount granted by the District Court against Whittier, yet he has not 
given back $600,000 worth of Wood River securities as required by statute. Consequently, even if 
Oregon law applies, entry of ajudgment without requiring Houston to return the securities was error. 
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Houston did not move for summary judgment on damages and therefore did not meet his burden on 
that issue. Even if he had, both Oregon and Idaho law required Houston to tender the securities at 
issue in exchange for a final judgment, and the District Court refused to require him to do so. 
Whittier respectfully requests that the grant of summaryjudgment be reversed and the matter 
remanded. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of November, 2008. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
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